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Azzolino v. Dingfelder: North Carolina Court of Appeals
Recognizes Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Claims
The recent development of medical processes to detect genetic defects in
unborn fetuses, I in combination with the recognition of a woman's legal right to
obtain an abortion,2 has caused a reformulation of the physician's duty of due
care in the area of prenatal malpractice torts. Recognition of this duty has led to
the development of new claims for relief, most notably those termed "wrongful
birth' 3 and "wrongful life."'4
This Note examines the development of these new tort claims and analyzes
the North Carolina Court of Appeals' decision in Azzolino v. Dingfelder.5 It
concludes that the court's novel formulation of damages is potentially detrimen-
tal to those it is designed to benefit and is an unwarranted abandonment of es-
tablished case law.
In October 1979 Michael Azzolino was born with a permanent genetic dis-
order known as Down's syndrome or mongolism.6 Michael's mother had re-
ceived prenatal care at the Haywood-Moncure Community Health Center (the
Clinic), a family health care facility operated by Orange-Chatham Comprehen-
sive Health Services, Inc. (OCCHS).7 During her visits to the Clinic, Mrs. Az-
zolino was under the care of Jean Dowdy, a registered nurse employed by the
Clinic as a family nurse practitioner, and Dr. James R. Dingfelder, a board-
certified obstetrician-gynecologist on the staff at North Carolina Memorial Hos-
pital in Chapel Hill.8 Dr. Dingfelder's duties at the Clinic included providing
prenatal care for patients and supervising the work of the family nurse
practitioners. 9
During the first trimester of her pregnancy Mrs. Azzolino asked Nurse
Dowdy about the advisability of having amniocentesis performed. 10 Nurse
1. These procedures include amniocentesis, ultrasonography, roentgenography, and fetoscopy.
See Elias & Verp, Prenatal Diagnosis of Genetic Disorders, 12 OBSTET. GYNECOL. ANN. 79 (1983).
For a discussion of amniocentesis and ultrasonography, see infra note 10.
2. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. For a discussion of the wrongful birth claim, see infra notes 25-59 and accompanying text.
4. For a discussion of the wrongful life claim, see infra notes 60-81 and accompanying text.
5. 71 N.C. App. 289, 322 S.E.2d 567 (1984), disc. rev. granted, 313 N.C. 327, 327 S.E.2d 887
(1985).
6. Normal human genes have 46 chromosomes, arranged in 23 pairs. Down's syndrome is a
chromosomal abnormality caused by the presence of a third chromosome in the twenty-first pair.
Individuals afflicted with Down's syndrome suffer moderate to severe mental retardation as well as
physical abnormalities such as a small, somewhat flattened skull, a short, flat-bridged nose, and
squared hands with shortened fingers. Reduced "sensory acuity levels," especially in the ability to
smell and taste, are common, as are coordination and reflex difficulties. See DORLAND'S ILLUS-
TRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1290 (26th ed. 1981); D. GIBSON, DowN's SYNDROME 6, 8-10
(1978).
7. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 292, 322 S.E.2d at 571.
8. Through a contractual arrangement between the University of North Carolina School of
Medicine and the Clinic, Dr. Dingfelder spent one-half day per week at the Clinic. Id.
9. Id.
10. Amniocentesis is a diagnostic procedure in which amniotic fluid (the fluid surrounding the
fetus in the womb) and fetal cells present in the fluid are aspirated with a syringe and tested for
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Dowdy advised Mrs. Azzolino not to undergo the procedure." During a later
appointment, Mrs. Azzolino questioned Dr. Dingfelder about amniocentesis,
stating that she had heard there was a need for such testing in pregnant women
over the age of thirty-five. 12 She was thirty-six at that time and was concerned
about the risk of having a deformed child. Dr. Dingfelder informed her that
amniocentesis was not necessary for women below age thirty-seven.' 3 He did
not perform amniocentesis on Mrs. Azzolino, nor did he advise her of the exist-
ence of a genetic counseling facility in Chapel Hill. If amniocentesis had been
performed, the genetic abnormality of the fetus would have been discovered in
time for Mrs. Azzolino to exercise her legal right to obtain an abortion.14
On October 13, 1981, the Azzolinos filed a medical malpractice action nam-
ing Dr. Dingfelder, Nurse Dowdy, and OCCHS as defendants.' 5 Three distinct
claims for relief, as well as a claim for punitive damages, were stated in the
complaint. In the first cause of action plaintiff parents set forth a "wrongful
birth" claim. They alleged that the individual defendants negligently had failed
to provide Mrs. Azzolino with complete and correct information with respect to
amniocentesis and the availability of genetic counseling. They further alleged
that if Mrs. Azzolino had been advised properly, she would have undergone
amniocentesis and would have discovered that her child, if born, would suffer
from Down's Syndrome. They alleged that given this knowledge Mrs. Azzolino
would have had the fetus aborted.16 In the second cause of action the child,
Michael Azzolino, set forth a "wrongful life" claim. He alleged that the negli-
gence of the physician caused him to be born afflicted with Down's Syndrome
instead of being aborted while still a fetus, "thereby damaging him by virtue of
his very existence."' 17 In the final cause of action Michael's half siblings claimed
damages due to the fact that the financial and emotional hardships resulting
from having a Down's Syndrome child in the family deprived them of the full
measure of parental comfort, care, and society.' 8
Defendants filed motions to dismiss all three claims for relief stated in the
biochemical and chromosomal defects. Amniocentesis usually is performed in conjunction with an
ultrasonic examination, a procedure that allows the physician to determine the position of the fetus
within the womb, thus reducing the risk that a vital organ of the fetus will be injured when the
needle is inserted into the amniotic sac. See Elias & Verp, supra note 1, at 79-80. Amniocentesis is
the standard test performed to detect Down's syndrome and has an accuracy rate of over 99%. See
Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 424,404 A.2d 8, 10 (1979); Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 317, 322 S.E.2d
at 586.
11. Nurse Dowdy's advice apparently was based solely on her belief that the problem of genetic
defects should be left "in God's hands." Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 311, 322 S.E.2d at 582. Nurse
Dowdy's only other discussion of amniocentesis with Mrs. Azzolino was to state the potential harm-
ful consequences of what she termed "a very dangerous procedure." Id. In fact, the increased risk
of either fetal or maternal injury produced by amniocentesis is less than one percent. See Elias and
Verp, supra note 1, at 83.
12. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 313, 322 S.E.2d at 583.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 314, 322 S.E.2d at 584.
15. Id. at 317, 322 S.E.2d at 586.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 292, 322 S.E.2d at 571.
18. Id.
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complaint. These motions were granted for the second and third claims. 19 De-
fendants' motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages
also was allowed, 20 leaving the parents' wrongful birth claim the sole cause of
action remaining for trial. At the close of plaintiffs' presentation of evidence,
defendants successfully moved for a directed verdict pursuant to Rule 50 of the
North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.21
Wrongful birth and its related causes of action were not recognized at com-
mon law.22 Consequently, when these claims first were asserted in the 1960s,
there was some confusion as to the terminology involved. 23 At present, the
claims for relief in prenatal malpractice cases in which the defect itself was not
caused by the defendant's negligence are divided into six categories. 24 By far the
19. Id. at 293, 322 S.E.2d at 572.
20. Id.
21. A motion for directed verdict is properly granted only if the plantiff fails to present evi-
dence sufficient to support a favorable finding on all the essential elements of his claim for relief. In a
tort action these essential elements are duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, and actual damages.
Id. at 310-11, 322 S.E.2d at 582.
That the directed verdicts were granted in favor of each defendant individually is important
because it separated the claims for appeal. An adverse finding against one defendant therefore would
not necessarily affect the others. See infra note 96.
22. See Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 259, 190 N.E.2d 849, 858, cert. denied, 379 U.S.
945 (1963); Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 294, 322 S.E.2d at 573.
23. The term "wrongful life" first was used in Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 259, 190
N.E.2d 849, 858, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1963). This claim would now be termed one for dissat-
isfied life. See infra note 24. Later courts have added to this confusion. See Robak v. United States,
658 F.2d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 1981) (wrongful pregnancy referred to as wrongful birth); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 772, 233 N.W.2d 372, 375 (1975) (confusing wrongful life or
wrongful birth with wrongful pregnancy); see also W. PROssER & W. KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS
§ 55, at 370 & n.34 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984) (Zepeda referred to as a wrongful life claim). For a
discussion of the distinction between wrongful birth, wrongful life, wrongful pregnancy, and dissatis-
fied life claims, see infra note 24.
24. The six claims are wrongful birth, wrongful life, wrongful pregnancy, unplanned life, dissat-
isfied life, and claims by the deformed infant's siblings. See infra text accompanying notes 25-59
(discussion of wrongful birth); infra text accompanying notes 60-81 (discussion of wrongful life).
Wrongful pregnancy is the parents' cause of action against the defendant physician for some negli-
gent act that results in the birth of a healthy, but unplanned, child. See Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal.
App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) (unsuccessful abortion); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240,
187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (tranquilizers negligently substituted for oral contraceptives); Clegg v.
Chase, 89 Misc. 2d 510, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (failed tubal ligation). Wrongful preg-
nancy is sometimes called wrongful conception. See Holt, Wrongful Pregnancy, 33 S.C.L. REv. 759
(1982). Unplanned life is the filial counterpart to the parents' wrongful pregnancy claim. These two
claims generally are joined. See Rogers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in
Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C.L. REv. 713, 718-20 (1982). Dissatisfied life is the
claim brought by an illegitimate child against his father, claiming injury by virtue of his status as an
illegitimate child. See Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849, cert. denied, 379 U.S.
945 (1963); Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966).
The courts of at least five jurisdictions have faced claims brought by the siblings of an unplan-
ned child, alleging damages to the extent that the new child diminished their share of parental
society, care, and financial support. This claim could be termed an "unplanned sibling" claim. See
White v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 146 (D. Kan. 1981); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.
1975); Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d 418 (Fla. App. 1974); Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo.
App. 1982); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1979); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc.
2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1974). In Azzolino the North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected a
similar claim by the siblings of a deformed child. See Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 306, 322 S.E.2d at
578-79. No court has recognized a cause of action for either the dissatisfied life or unplanned sibling
claims. See Rogers, supra, at 729 & n. 119 (dissatisfied life claims successful); Azzolino, 71 N.C. App.
at 303-04, 322 S.E.2d at 578 (unplanned sibling claims unsuccessful).
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most important of these claims are those for wrongful birth and wrongful life.
Wrongful birth is a claim for relief brought by the parents of a child born
with genetic defects25 or other abnormalities 26 discoverable during the first tri-
mester of pregnancy.2 7 A negligent act of the mother's doctor28 is alleged to
have caused this defect to go undiscovered until after the birth of the child. The
plaintiff parents claim that but for the negligence of the doctor, they would have
obtained a legal abortion and avoided the burdens of caring for a deformed
child. Although not a traditional cause of action, wrongful birth fits into the
traditional tort framework29 as a medical malpractice claim.
The first case to address a wrongful birth claim squarely was Gleitman v.
Cosgrove,30 a 1967 New Jersey Supreme Court decision. In Gleitman defendant
doctor negligently made the erroneous statement that the mother's contraction
of German measles during pregnancy would not harm the fetus. Full informa-
tion on the risk of German measles was within the professional knowledge of
defendant's speciality. 31 The mother alleged that she might have secured an
abortion had she been aware of the risk of birth defects resulting from her condi-
tion.32 Plaintiff parents sought damages for the mental anguish and severe fi-
25. Examples of parental suits for undiscovered genetic defects include Phillips v. United
States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1980) (Down's syndrome); Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ.
Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (ray-Sachs disease); Call v. Kazirian, 135 Cal. App. 2d
189, 185 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1982) (Down's syndrome); Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834
(1981) (cystic fibrosis); Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421,404 A.2d 8 (1979) (Down's syndrome); Becker
v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (Down's syndrome); Park v.
Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977) (polycystic kidney disease), aff'd sub nom. Becker
v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 71
N.C. App. 289, 322 S.E.2d 567 (1984) (Down's syndrome); Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 290
S.E.2d 825 (1982) (Tay-Sachs disease).
26. Most nonhereditary fetal defects are caused by a disease contracted or a drug taken by the
woman during pregnancy. The most common defect-producing disease is rubella, or German mea-
sles. See Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981); Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich.
App. 357, 308 N.W.2d 209 (1981); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). Although often filed as products liability
claims, suits based on defects produced by the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) can be viewed as wrong-
ful life claims. As in all wrongful life claims, if the defendant had not performed the negligent act
complained of-distributing a dangerous drug designed to prevent miscarriage-the plaintiff child
probably would not have been born. A leading case in this area is Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26
Cal. 3d 558, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1981). See
Abrahams & Musgrove, The DES Labyrinth, 33 S.C.L. REv. 663 (1982).
27. The timing of the defect's discoverability is important because it determines the availability
of an abortion to terminate the pregnancy. Since a woman has an absolute right to obtain an abor-
tion during the first trimester of pregnancy, the birth of an infant suffering from a defect discoverable
during the first trimester is due to the choice of the child's mother, or to the negligence of the
mother's physician. See infra note 77.
28. To support a claim for relief, the negligent act or omission could have been the fault of the
doctor, a nurse, a lab technician, or some other provider of prenatal health care. This negligence
could have taken several forms. See infra text accompanying notes 43-48.
29. The elements of a tort claim are the presence of a duty owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff, a breach of that duty, a close causal relationship between the breach of duty and the injury
to the plaintiff, and actual injury or damages suffered by the plaintiff. Lowery v. Newton, 52 N.C.
App. 234, 237, 278 S.E.2d 566, 570 (1981); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 23, § 30, at 164-
65.
30. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
31. Id. at 25-26, 227 A.2d at 690-91.
32. Id. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691. This allegation by the mother might have given defendant a
strong defense. By claiming that but for defendant's assurances she "might" have had an abortion,
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nancial burdens associated with raising a deformed child. 33
The court denied recovery on three grounds. First, it stated that the par-
ents' claim did not demonstrate the essential element of proximate cause; 34 be-
cause the child's defect resulted from the disease contracted by his mother and
not from any act of defendant, the court concluded that causation could not be
shown. The court noted that the result would have been different if plaintiff
parents had shown an "act or omission which result[ed] in impairment to what
otherwise would [have been] a normal, healthy child."'35 Second, the court
stated that even if the parents had been informed of the possible risks to the
fetus, their only alternative to having the child was abortion, a procedure subject
to criminal sanction in New Jersey.36 Since the doctor could not have been
negligent in refusing to perform a criminal abortion, he could not have been
negligent in failing to advise the parents to consider such an abortion.
Third, the court reasoned that had the parents been able to obtain an abor-
tion lawfully, their claim would fail for lack of ascertainable damages.37 Dam-
ages in a tort action are compensatory and are "measured by comparing the
condition plaintiff would have been in had the defendants not been negligent,
with plaintiff's impaired condition as a result of the negligence." s38 In a wrong-
ful birth claim the parents allege that but for the negligence of the mother's
doctor, their deformed child would not have been born. This claim would re-
quire the court to assign a value to the "intangible, unmeasurable, and com-
plex"' 39 benefits of parenthood that plaintiff parents would not have experienced
had they obtained an abortion, and to compare this value with the alleged bur-
dens incurred in raising a child with birth defects. For the parents to state a
recognizable injury, the burden of parenthood must outweigh the benefits. The
court believed that such a determination was impossible. 40
A major portion of the court's reasoning in Gleitman was invalidated by the
landmark abortion decision Roe v. Wade.41 In ruling that a state has no legiti-
mate interest in prohibiting abortions during the first trimester of pregnancy,4 2
the Supreme Court not only effectively nullified the "inherent sanctity of life"
argument, but also eliminated the causation problem. Because a woman's right
to have an abortion is a fundamental right, the decision implied that liability can
plaintiff mother made proof of causation difficult. The implication of her statement is that she might
not have elected to obtain an abortion. Later plaintiffs have avoided this problem by alleging that
but for the negligence of the defendant, an abortion "would" have been obtained. See, eg., Azzolino,
71 N.C. App. at 292, 322 S.E2d at 571.
33. Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691.
34. Id. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693-94. The court's claim in Geitman is premised on the idea of the
inherent sanctity of human life, an idea also noted in In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
37. Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 29-30, 227 A.2d at 693.
38. Id. at 29, 227 A.2d at 692.
39. Id. at 29, 227 A.2d at 693.
40. Id.
41. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
42. Id. at 164.
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attach to all acts or omissions that abridge that right. The failure to inform a
woman of special conditions that might produce a deformed infant would oper-
ate to discourage her from making an informed decision as to whether to exer-
cise her right to obtain an abortion. Therefore, a woman's doctor has a duty to
inform her of such high risk conditions. This duty would be breached if the
doctor (1) failed to inform the woman that a diagnostic procedure existed, 43 (2)
failed to inform the woman of a high-risk condition for which no diagnostic
testing was available,44 (3) informed the woman of the diagnostic test but negli-
gently failed to perform the test,4 5 (4) informed the woman of the diagnostic test
but negligently advised her not to undergo the test,46 (5) performed the diagnos-
tic test in a negligent manner, obtaining an incorrect result,47 or (6) performed
the diagnostic test but failed to inform the woman of the test results. 48 Any of
these failures would deprive the woman of information essential to an informed
decision as to whether to obtain an abortion, thus proximately causing the birth
of the deformed infant.
The problem of unprovable damages noted in Gleitman still exists even in
the wake of Roe, but it apparently has caused few problems for the courts. This
development may be reflective of the trend toward allowing recovery of damages
for purely psychic injuries begun with Dillon v. Legg49 in 1968. The increased
certainty with which psychiatrists have been able to measure mental anguish is
considered to be a major factor in allowing recovery for damages once thought
too speculative to be proved.50
Most of the wrongful birth cases decided since Roe have tended to accept
wrongful birth as a variety of the traditional negligence action.51 As in all medi-
cal malpractice claims, the physician's duty of due care is created by virtue of his
professional relationship with the patient.5 2 The defendant's conduct in com-
parison to the accepted standard of professional behavior determines whether
that duty has been breached. Other jurisdictions also employ an objective stan-
dards test, frequently couched in terms of the customary community standards
43. See Karsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977).
44. See Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981).
45. There appears to be no reported case illustrating this type of negligent behavior. Imposing
liability in this instance would be consistent with the general pattern of imposing liability for failure
to present a pregnant woman with information relevant to her consideration of obtaining an abor-
tion. See infra notes 75-77 & 86-87 and accompanying text.
46. See Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 71 N.C. App. 289, 322 S.E.2d 567 (1984).
47. See Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
48. Although there is no reported authority illustrating this type of negligent behavior, impos-
ing liability would be logically consistent with cases imposing liability for failure to present a preg-
nant woman with information relevant to her decision to either obtain an abortion or give birth. See
infra notes 75-77 & 86-87 and accompanying text.
49. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
50. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 23, § 54, at 361-62.
51. See, eg., Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982); Eis-
brenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 357, 308 N.W.2d 209 (1981); Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478
A.2d 755 (1984); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977); Harbeson v. Parke-
Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983).
52. See Byrd, The North Carolina Medical Malpractice Statute, 62 N.C.L. REV. 711, 713
(1984).
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for behavior. 53 As noted above,54 interference with the woman's right to obtain
an abortion is sufficient to establish proximate cause. The only substantial area
of disagreement among jurisdictions that have considered wrongful birth claims
has been the question of the proper measure of damages.
Damage awards in wrongful birth cases can be divided into four categories.
First, the court can award parents all the costs they will have to bear as a result
of the defendant's negligent act. These costs would include the normal expenses
of raising an ordinary child, the extraordinary expenses to be incurred for the
care and treatment of an impaired child, and the mental anguish suffered by the
parents as a consequence of caring for their deformed child. 55 Second, the court
can approach the issue of causation in a slightly broader fashion. Instead of
focusing solely on the fact that but for the defendant's negligent act this particu-
lar deformed child would not have been born, courts can consider the expecta-
tions of the plaintiffs. Some courts have reasoned that since the plaintiffs in a
wrongful birth suit intended to become parents, they also must have intended to
bear the ordinary expenses of their child. The normal expenses of raising a
child, therefore, are deducted from any award for damages. Thus, only the par-
ents' mental anguish and the extraordinary expenses involved in raising an im-
paired child will be awarded.5
6
Third, some courts allow the plaintiff parents to recover only for the ex-
53. See State v. Ulin, 113 Ariz. 141, 143, 548 P.2d 19, 21 (1976) ("recognized standards of good
medical practice in the community"); Hickman v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co., 311 So. 2d 778, 779
(Fla. 1975) (to be liable doctor must act "clearly against the course recognized as correct by his
profession"); Jackovach v. Yocum, 212 Iowa 914, 925, 237 N.W. 444, 449 (1931) ("usual and cus-
tomary practice among physicians and surgeons in the same or similar localities"); Goheen v. Gra-
her, 181 Kan. 107, 111-12, 309 P.2d 636, 637 (1957) ("reasonable degree of learning and skill
ordinarily possessed by members of his profession. . . in the community where he practices or
similar communities"); Cervantes v. Forbis, 73 N.M. 445, 448, 389 P.2d 210, 213 (1964) ("recog-
nized standards of medical practice in the community"); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 78 Wash.
2d 460, 467, 656 P.2d 483, 489 (1983) ("degree of skill expected of the average. . . practitioner, in
the class to which defendant belongs").
54. See supra text accompanying notes 42-48.
55. Only one court has adopted this formulation of damages in a wrongful birth action. See
Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying Alabama law). An offset for the
normal costs of child care is a sounder rule for the reasons stated in the text accompanying note 56.
The Robak rule is better suited to wrongful pregnancy claims since in those cases no child was
expected or desired by the plaintiff parents. About half of the courts faced with wrongful pregnancy
claims have allowed damages consistent with Robak. The others have disallowed recovery for nor-
mal expenses of child raising because of the "offsetting benefit" rule. The different approaches to this
problem and the courts that have adopted each position are noted in Hartke v. McKelway, 526 F.
Supp. 97, 104 (D.D.C. 1981). For a discussion of the "offsetting benefit" rule, see infra note 56.
56. See Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 357, 308 N.W.2d 209 (1981); Harbeson v. Parke-
Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983). The parents' mental anguish is a compensable
injury because there is a general public policy "to compensate parents not only for pecuniary loss but
also for emotional injury." Id. at 475, 656 P.2d at 493.
The Eisbrenner court used RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979) to justify deduct-
ing from damages the normal expenses of raising a child. Section 920 states:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his property
and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was
harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to the
extent that this is equitable.
The court concluded that the various benefits of parenthood would offset at least part of any award
for the parents' mental anguish. Eisbrenner, 106 Mich. App. at 367-68, 308 N.W.2d at 214.
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traordinary expenses involved in raising the deformed childA7 Although they
accept the idea of offsetting the award by the normal costs of raising a child,
they will not recognize an award for the parents' mental anguish. These juris-
dictions believe that mental anguish damages are not sufficiently ascertainable.
Last, some courts have awarded damages only for the mental anguish of the
parents, with no compensation given for the costs of raising a child. At least
three different rationales have been offered in support of such an award.5 8 The
extraordinary medical and educational expenses of the impaired child are so
clearly a proper subject of recovery, however, that no jurisdiction which recog-
nizes the wrongful life cause of action denies that additional recovery.5 9
The other major cause of action in the area of prenatal malpractice torts is
the wrongful life claim. Unlike wrongful birth, in which the parents sue directly
as plaintiffs, a wrongful life action is brought in the name of the impaired child.
This difference has made most courts, including those that recognize an action
for wrongful birth, unwilling to accept wrongful life claims.6° Analysis of the
four elements of a traditional tort claim as applied to wrongful life cases high-
lights several different criticisms of the claim.
First, the very nature of the claim has caused some courts to decide that it
is not a traditional tort. In a wrongful life claim, the plaintiff child alleges that
the defendant physician negligently permitted the child to be born, thereby caus-
ing the child to suffer life with a permanent disability. The child's very existence
is alleged to constitute its injury. Given the high value society places on human
57. See Moore v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. App. 1981); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401,
386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer
v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). The reluctance of these states to
award damages for mental anguish is not limited to wrongful birth cases. In the area of bystander
tort, in which a witness to a tort committed against a third person recovers for mental anguish, the
leading case allowing recovery, Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72
(1968), had not been followed by any of the four states in question at the time the above noted cases
were decided. The Dillon rule since has been adopted in Texas. See Landrith v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d
486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
58. See Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73,
394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 71 N.C. App. 289, 322 S.E.2d 567 (1984), disc.
rev. granted, 313 N.C. 327, 327 S.E.2d 887 (1985). In Berman the court considered the complete
educational expenses of the child without isolating the additional costs of educating an impaired
child. It held that "such an award would be wholly disproportionate to the culpability involved, and
. . . would. . . constitute a windfall to the parents." Berman, 80 N.J. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
Although the Karlsons court stated that an award for mental anguish would be proper, it does not
seem to have considered an award for the child's expenses. Karlsons, 57 A.D.2d at 78-79, 394
N.Y.S.2d at 936-37. In Azzolino the court concluded that "the unusual nature of the wrongful life
and wrongful birth actions" required that only the child be allowed to recover for these extraordi-
nary expenses. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 302, 322 S.E.2d at 577.
59. The New Jersey Supreme Court allowed the parents to recover extraordinary child support
expenses in Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981). The New York Court of Appeals
allowed similar recovery in Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895
(1978). The court of appeals inAzzolino also permitted the child to sue for these expenses. Azzolino,
71 N.C. App. at 302, 322 S.E.2d at 577.
60. See, ag., Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1981); Gildiner v. Thomas
Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 357,
308 N.W.2d 209 (1981); Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), aff'd sub nonm.
Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
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life61 and the lack of any common-law precedent for wrongful life claims,62
some courts have concluded that no legally recognized wrong has been
committed.
Second, Roe v. Wade,63 the decision that provided the rationale for the
parents' wrongful birth claim, also has created an impediment to the recognition
of wrongful life actions. In Roe the Court held that a fetus was not protected by
the fourteenth amendment because a fetus is not a person.64 It therefore can be
argued that the physician owes no duty to the fetus, since a duty is defined as
"that [obligation] which a person owes to another." 65 Without the essential ele-
ment of duty, the plaintiff can not maintain a negligence action. Prior to Roe,
the "no duty" argument was not raised, probably because the fetus was treated
as a person in state abortion statutes.66
Third, some courts have held the plaintiff child unable to prove causation.
67
The child's defect was not actually produced by the defendant's negligent act,
but by some external factor such as disease or a genetic trait present in the
child's mother. These courts, therefore, are unwilling to impose liability on a
physician for a condition he did not "cause." The physician "caused" the
child's deformity only in the sense that he prevented the child's destruction as a
fetus. 68 The idea that such destruction is a reasonable alternative to life-how-
ever tortured-is rejected by these courts.
Last, by far the most troublesome aspect of a wrongful life claim is as-
signing a value to the alleged damages. The traditional tort damage award-
placing the injured party in the position he would have occupied "but for" the
acts of the defendant-is inapplicable. If the defendant had not acted in a negli-
gent manner, the plaintiff would not have been born. To determine damages the
court must compare the current position of the plaintiff-living with a perma-
nent impairment-with the position the plaintiff would have been in had the
defendant not been negligent-aborted while still a fetus. This determination
necessarily requires the court to place a value on "the utter void of nonexis-
tence" 69 and has caused some courts to rule that wrongful birth claims fail for
lack of ascertainable damages.70
Not all courts have found these difficulties insurmountable. The highest
61. See supra note 36.
62. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
63. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
64. Id. at 158.
65. BLACK'S LAW DIcIONARY 453 (5th ed. 1979).
66. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 n.55. The Court noted certain inconsistencies with this argument.
Id. at 157-58 n.54.
67. See Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Berman v.
Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Trex. 1975).
68. But cf notes 42-48 and accompanying text (a woman has a fundamental right to obtain an
abortion).
69. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 28, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967).
70. See Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49
N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d
895 (1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (rex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 59 Wis.
2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
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courts of three states have recognized wrongful life as an example of the tradi-
tional medical malpractice claim.71 Various theories have been used to over-
come each of the objections previously raised against wrongful life claims.
Two theories have been proposed in support of the existence of a duty owed
by the woman's doctor to her unborn fetus. A major argument against the find-
ig of such a duty can be negated if the fetus is assumed to be a person. Despite
the Roe holding, a fetus is recognized as a legal person for several purposes, 72
including the well-established proposition that an infant can recover damages
for other prenatal torts.73 There is no reason this rule should not apply in
wrongful life cases. Second, even if the fetus is not recognized as a person, the
duty owed to its mother would extend to it as well. This idea is taken from
section 311 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.74 The physician's duty is not
to prevent the birth of an impaired child but rather to inform the parents so that
they can make an intelligent decision as to "whether life is best for the child."75
Determining whether there has been a breach of duty is a question of fact to
be addressed at trial.7 6 The threshold determination in wrongful life cases is
whether the child's defect was such that a reasonable physician would have
known of its presence by the end of the first trimester.7 7 Failure to perform
diagnostic tests that would have discovered the impairment is a breach of the
duty of due care.
71. See Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982); Procanik v.
Cilo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d
483 (1983).
72. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161-62 (1973). These rights, however, are contingent upon
the live birth of the child. See infra note 73.
73. The right of a child to sue for prenatal injuries first was recognized in Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65
F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). All jurisdictions now permit a child to recover for prenatal injuries
produced by a direct act of the defendant, but only if the child is born alive. See W. PRossER & W.
KEETON, supra note 23, § 55, at 368. If a plaintiff chooses to bring a wrongful life claim under this
theory, the threshold requirement of live birth will, by definition, always be satisfied.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965) provides:
Negligent Misrepresentation Involving Risk of Physical Harm
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability for physical
harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such information,
where such harm results
(a) to the other
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the action
taken.
Comment b to this section is particularly illustrative of the wrongful life action. It provides that
it is as much a part of the professional duty of a physician to give correct information as to
the character of the disease from which his patient is suffering, where such knowledge is
necessary to the safety of the patient or others, as it is to make a correct diagnosis or to
prescribe the appropriate medicine.
Id. comment b.
75. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 298, 322 S.E.2d at 574.
76. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 23, § 37, at 237.
77. Since Roe v. Wade a pregnant woman has had an absolute right to obtain an abortion in the
first trimester of pregnancy. If the defect in the fetus is not discoverable until after the first trimester,
the physician cannot be held liable for negligence, since nothing he could have done would have
provided the woman with more complete information as to the desirability of an abortion. Liability
will attach in cases of a defect that the physician negligently fails to discover during the first trimes-
ter because at that time the woman could have pursued abortion as an alternative to allowing the
birth of the child.
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The element of causation, once considered unprovable in wrongful life
cases, 78 no longer is considered a major obstacle. The defendant's argument
that the mother's condition is the actual cause of the child's injury, although
literally true, does not reach the essence of the complaint. The plaintiffs do not
claim that the physician produced the genetic condition in the child's mother.
Nor do they argue that the defect in the fetus was produced by some negligent
act of the defendant. Instead, they allege that the defendant's acts precluded any
parental decision to abort the fetus 79 and that this negligence caused the birth of
a deformed infant whose very life constitutes injury.
Determining the proper measure of damages has been difficult for the
courts that have recognized the wrongful life claim. By claiming that his injury
results from the very fact of life itself, the child is claiming, in effect, that not
having been born would have been preferable to living with a deformity. This
claim for the general damages resulting from life with a deformity has never
been recognized. 80 Some courts, however, have allowed the child's claim for the
extraordinary expenses for education, medical treatment, and special care neces-
sitated by his impairment.8" Such special damages are both compensatory in
nature and sufficiently ascertainable to be awarded without undue speculation.
Azzolino v. Dingfelder82 presented the first opportunity for a North Caro-
lina court to evaluate the wrongful life, wrongful birth, and unplanned sibling
claims.83 Following a review of the purposes and functions of the motion to
dismiss, 84 the court considered Michael Azzolino's wrongful life claim in light
of the essential elements of a traditional negligence action. First, the court de-
termined that the defendants owed Michael a duty. This duty arose not only
from an extension of defendants' duty to Michael's mother, but also from
Miechael's independent right to damages for other prenatal torts. Thus, both
rationales used by other jurisdictions to establish a duty to the child were
78. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
79. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 306, 322 S.E.2d at 580.
80. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON , supra note 23, § 55, at 371.
81. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 238, 643 P.2d 954, 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 348
(1982); Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 351, 478 A.2d 755, 762 (1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.,
98 Wash. 2d 460, 479, 656 P.2d 483, 495 (1983). For examples of other attempts to develop a
formula for measuring damages in prenatal torts cases, see Note, Park v. Chessin: The Continuing
Judicial Development of the Theory of "Wrongful Life," 4 AM. J. LAW & MED. 211 (1979); Note, A
Cause of Action for "Wrongful Life" [A Suggested Analysis], 55 MINN. L. REv. 58 (1970).
82. 71 N.C. App. 289, 322 S.E.2d 567 (1984), disc rev. granted, 313 N.C. 327, 327 S.E.2d 887
(1985).
83. Prior to discussing the merits of the allegations, the court had to decide whether a timely
appeal had been filed by Michael. Defendants claimed that Michael's right to appeal was forfeited
because it was not exercised within 10 days of the granting of the motion to dismiss. The court ruled
that while an appeal could have been made at that time, it was only necessary after the granting of
the directed verdict against the parents' claims. The directed verdict marked the date of final judg-
ment because the claims of Michael and his parents were not separate and distinct. Id. at 294, 322
S.E.2d at 572.
84. The court noted that the sole function of the motion to dismiss is to test the complaint for
legal sufficiency, compelling the trial court to treat the allegations of the challenged pleading as true.
The motion should not be granted unless "the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim that would entitle him to relief." Id. at 295, 322 S.E.2d at 573.
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adopted by the court.8 5
Second, the court considered the question whether this duty had been
breached. Because defendants' duty to the mother required disclosure of "mate-
rial information about genetic risk," failure to disclose such information evi-
denced a breach of the duty of due care.8 6 The lack of this information
effectively precluded the rational exercise of the mother's right to obtain an
abortion. Interference with this right established the third essential element of
the claim, proximate cause.87 The evidence of causation was particulary strong
in this case.88
Last, the court considered the joint questions of actual injury and appropri-
ate damages.8 9 Like all other jurisdictions that have considered the matter, the
court concluded that the claim for general damages was speculative. 90 The
court, however, also determined that Michael's claim for special damages was
cognizable at law. These special expenses include "the extraordinary costs of
special treatment, teaching, care, medical services, aid and assistance [required]
for the child because of his impairment." 9 1 Unlike the other jurisdictions that
allow both the wrongful birth and wrongful life claims, the court in Azzolino
ruled that these special damages could be recovered only by the child.92
The court next considered what might be called the "unplanned sibling"
claim. The court noted that five other jurisdictions had considered and disal-
lowed similar claims.93 Fatal flaws were noted in each of the three theories
plaintiffs used to justify their claim.94 The court concluded that "there is no
basis in law or logic for such an action."'95
Finally, the court considered the parental claim of wrongful birth.
Favorable resolution of the wrongful life claim virtually predetermined the out-
come of the wrongful birth claim. 96 The elements of duty, breach, and proxi-
85. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
86. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 297, 322 S.E.2d at 574.
87. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
88. Mrs. Azzolino testified that "if she had been told there was a 50% chance of injury to the
fetus occurring and a one in 2,000 chance of having a child with Down's Syndrome, she still would
have had amniocentesis." Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 317, 322 S.E.2d at 586. Evidence also was
presented to demonstrate that Mrs. Azzolino had obtained abortions on two earlier occasions. The
evidence supported her contention that she would have had an abortion in this instance if the risks
had been explained to her. Id.
89. Id. at 299, 322 S.E.2d at 576.
90. Id. at 300, 322 S.E.2d at 576. See supra text accompanying note 80.
91. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 301, 322 S.E.2d at 576.
92. The other jurisdictions to allow this claim permit either the child or the parents to recover
the special damages. See supra note 71.
93. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 303, 322 S.E.2d at 578; see supra note 24.
94. First, the court rejected the negligence theory because the doctor owed no duty to the
deformed child's siblings. Second, a claim based on nuisance theories was ruled to be applicable only
in instances of unreasonable interference with a real property right. Last, the court ruled that a
claim based on the loss of parental consortium is not recognized in North Carolina. Azzolino, 71
N.C. App. at 304-06, 322 S.E.2d at 578-79.
95. Id. at 304, 322 S.E.2d at 578.
96. The court's ruling in plaintiffs' favor on the wrongful birth and wrongful life claims was
based solely on the evidence of Doctor Dingfelder's negligence. Because he treated Mrs. Azzolino
within the scope of his employment at the Clinic, the doctrine of respondeat superior could have
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mate cause found to exist in the child's cause of action are all derived from the
initial duty owed by the physician to the mother. A few distinctions, however,
merit attention. First, North Carolina has adopted a statute pertaining to the
standard of care applicable to medical malpractice actions. 97 A key provision of
this statute is that liability will not exist unless the physician's act was "not in
accordance with the standards of practice among members of the same health
care profession. . situated in the same or similar communities ... ."98 The
enactment of the "same or similar community" rule "presumably reflects the
belief, based in large part on the well-worn distinction between the country doc-
tor and the big city doctor, that the quality of medical practice differs with the
character of communities and that the standard of care, to be fair, must reflect
this difference." 9 9 In Azzolino defendant physician sought to use this rule to
limit his duty of care to the performance of the services the Clinic could have
been expected to provide. 1° ° The court was not persuaded by this argument,
and held defendant to the standard of care exercised at North Carolina Memo-
rial Hospital. 10 1
Second, the court justified its recognition of the wrongful birth claim with
reference to its earlier recognition of the wrongful pregnancy claim.102
Although the court did not articulate its reasoning on this point, one possible
argument is obvious. If damages are to be awarded in wrongful pregnancy cases
for the birth of a healthy but unwanted child, it seems inequitable not to afford
similar relief to the parents of a child born with a serious deformity. Third, the
court recognized the public policy of holding negligent individuals liable for the
consequences of their actions.103
Last, the court once again was faced with the question of the appropriate
measure of damages. After reviewing the approaches taken by other jurisdic-
supported a finding against OCCHS. The court of appeals therefore ruled that the directed verdicts
in favor of the clinic and OCCHS were erroneously granted. Id. at 318-19, 322 S.E.2d at 586-87.
The directed verdict in favor of Jean Dowdy was upheld because plaintiffs were unable to establish
the essential element of proximate cause. Id. at 312, 322 S.E.2d at 583.
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-21.11 to -21.14 (1981).
98. Id. § 90-21.12; see Byrd, supra note 52, at 723.
99. Byrd, supra note 52, at 713. The Azzolino court quoted and relied on this passage. See
Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 315, 322 S.E.2d at 585.
100. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 315, 322 S.E.2d at 585.
101. Id. The use of North Carolina Memorial Hospital (NCMH) as the relevant community
was important for finding a breach of duty. Testimony of other physicians practicing at NCMH
indicated that while genetic testing would be recommended for women age 37 and over, such testing
would be performed on younger women if they showed "high concern" about genetic defects of the
fetus. "High concern" was defined as "sufficient concern to have talked to their obstetrician or
someone. . . ." Id. at 315, 322 S.E.2d at 584-85. Doctor Dingfelder apparently believed that the
other physicians at the Clinic would have performed amniocentesis only on women over age 37. Not
performing amniocentesis on Mrs. Azzolino therefore would have been in accordance with the ac-
cepted practice at the Clinic, though it may have been negligent for someone practicing in the
NCMH community. Id. at 315-16, 322 S.E.2d at 585.
102. See Jackson v. Bumgardner, 71 N.C. App. 107, 321 S.E.2d 541 (1984), disc. rev. granted,
312 N.C. 797, 325 S.E.2d 486 (1985) (arguments heard April 8, 1985); Pierce v. Piver, 45 N.C. App.
111, 262 S.E.2d 320, appeal dismissed, 300 N.C. 375 (1980) (The decision dismissing the appeal was
not included in the Southeastern Reporter.).
103. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 307-08, 322 S.E.2d at 580.
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tions,1° 4 the court decided that an award for the complete cost of raising the
child would be "wholly disproportionate to the culpability involved and would
place an unreasonable financial burden on health care providers." 10 5 The court
also noted that an award for punitive damages would be inappropriate. 10 6 Hav-
ing earlier decided to allow only the child to maintain an action for extraordi-
nary support expenses, the court ruled that the parents could recover damages
"only for the mental anguish which they have endured and will continue to
endure as a result of the birth of the impaired child."10 7 This division of dam-
ages marks a change from the established law of this state and may be detrimen-
tal to the interests of those persons it is designed to protect.
It is a settled rule in North Carolina and other states that the tortious ac-
tion of a third party which produces injury to a minor child creates two distinct
claims for relief. These claims are:
(1) the right of the child to recover for his mental and physical pain
and suffering, and the impairment of earning capacity after attaining
majority; and (2) the right of the parent to recover for loss of services
of the child during minority, and other pecuniary expenses incurred or
likely to be incurred by the parent as a consequence of the injury, in-
cluding expenses of medical treatment.108
If wrongful birth and wrongful life claims are recognized as essentially simi-
lar to accepted traditional torts, the traditional damages rules should not be
summarily discarded. As noted above, the child's claim for general damages has
been rejected uniformly as not susceptible to nonspeculative proof.10 9 This con-
clusion leaves only the parents' claim for the extraordinary expenses of raising
an impaired child.110 These damages traditionally have been recoverable by the
parents as an incident of their duty to provide for the support of their child. The
court noted in Azzolino that "it is the child who suffers if the money is not there
to pay for the care that he needs.""' Apparently believing that this situation
was unusual, the court held these special damages recoverable only by the child.
Although it is true that a child born with a deformity would suffer if the proper
care were not provided, the same could be said about a child who was born
healthy but became impaired shortly after birth as the result of a defendant's
conduct. Even if unusual circumstances qualify the child's action for special
damages, there is no reason to deny the parents' traditional claim. Allowing
either the parents or the child to bring an action for extraordinary support ex-
penses would bring North Carolina into agreement with the other jurisdictions
that have recognized both the wrongful life and wrongful birth claims.' 12
104. Id. at 308, 322 S.E.2d at 581; see supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
105. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 309, 322 S.E.2d at 581.
106. Id. at 320, 322 S.E.2d at 587-88.
107. Id. at 309, 322 S.E.2d at 581.
108. 3 R. LEE, N.C. FAMmY LAW § 241, at 218 (4th ed. 1981).
109. See supra text accompanying note 80.
110. Although not a traditional element of damages, the modem trend is to allow recovery for
the parents' mental anguish. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
111. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 302, 322 S.E.2d at 577.
112. See supra note 71 (list of cases from these jurisdictions).
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Several policy considerations support the majority rule recognizing the pa-
rental claim for extraordinary support expenses of a child born with a deformity.
First, the recognition of this parental claim is evidence of the high value society
places on the family unit. Taking the right to sue for the child's injuries away
from the parents only lessens the esteem accorded the family relationship. The
court's refusal to allow the parents to recover extraordinary support expenses is
tantamount to claiming that the special relationships within the family are no
longer worthy of protection. 113
Second, the parents' duty to provide care and support for their children
long has been recognized in this State. 114 This duty has been cited as a major
reason for allowing the parents' claim for damages." 5 Nothing in the Azzolino
opinion suggests that this traditional duty has changed. There is, therefore, no
reason to abandon such a fundamental rule of damage recovery.
As an alternative to the traditional rule of parental recovery, the court in
Azzolino proposed creation of a guardianship for the benefit of the child. 116
Guardianships often are formed when a child obtains a large sum of money or
other valuable property. 17 Although this form of fiduciary relationship has the
advantage of ensuring the existence of the funds necessary for the care of the
child, several potential drawbacks should be noted. First, the formalities of a
fiduciary relationship can transform even simple transactions, such as the pay-
ment of the child's expenses and the sale of investment securities, into cumber-
some procedures." 8 Second, such proceedings can be expensive. Annual
accountings must be filed with the court. The costs of preparing such records, as
well as the fiduciary's commission, are payable from the ward's property.119
These requirements diminish the amount of money available for the child's sup-
port. Last, although the opinion is unclear, there is some doubt whether the
parents could qualify as the child's guardians. If the court were not troubled by
the parents' inability to handle the damage award in a prudent manner, the
113. Among the damages traditionally recoverable following injury to an unemancipated minor
child is the value of the services and earnings of the child lost due to the injury. Such recovery
follows from an interference with a unique parental right. See 3 R. LEE, supra note 108, § 241, at
220. Recovery by a third-party guardian, see infra text accompanying note 116, is inconsistent with
this traditional obligation.
114. See Floyd v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 167 N.C. 55, 59-60, 83 S.E. 12, 14 (1914).
115. See 3 R. LEE, supra note 108, § 241, at 221.
116. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 302, 322 S.E.2d at 577.
117. See G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 17, at 37 (5th ed. 1973).
118. A guardian, like a trustee, is a fiduciary with certain powers and duties prescribed by
statute.
The powers of a guardian are ordinarily narrower than those of a trustee. . . . In many
states a guardian can make no investment without the authority of the court which ap-
pointed him, nor can he without such authority sell land of his ward. The authority of a
guardian does not extend beyond the jurisdiction of the court which appointed him ....
I A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUsTS § 7, at 73 (3d ed. 1967).
In North Carolina, payment of support costs from the ward's property is subject to the formali-
ties specified in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-6 (1984). The special proceedings involved in the sale of
property are outlined in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 33-31, -33 (1984). The guardian's power of investment
is defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36A-1, -2 (1984).
119. The annual accounting procedure is set forth in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-39 (1984). The
guardian's commission is provided for in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-43 (1984).
19851 TORTS 1343
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
guardianship itself would not be necessary. These doubts also could disqualify
the parents as guardians. There is judicial precedent for disallowing parents as
guardians on the grounds that the interests of the two relationships are naturally
inconsistent. 120 These criticisms are not intended to suggest that the use of a
guardianship is necessarily improper, or that it would be improper in this in-
stance. Indeed, special circumstances may merit the creation of a fiduciary rela-
tionship.1 21 This criticism of the court's decision in Azzolino, however, is
directed to the general rule that a guardianship is required in wrongful life cases.
A more logical rule would allow the trial judge, the authority most familiar with
the special circumstances of each case, to use his discretion in ordering the crea-
tion of a guardianship. 122
In a case of first impression, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has cho-
sen to recognize claims for relief based on wrongful birth and wrongful life. This
enlightened holding brings the state in line with the progressive jurisdictions that
have considered these claims. Despite its assertion that wrongful birth and
wrongful life are forms of the traditional medical malpractice claim the court
adopted a nontraditional and insupportable formulation of damages. Action
should be taken on appeal to allow the parents to recover in their own names the
extraordinary support costs attributable to their impaired child.
DOUGLAS EDWARD PECK
120. See White v. Osborne, 251 N.C. 56, 110 S.E.2d 449 (1959).
121. One such circumstance would be the parents' inability to manage large sums of money.
Another factor would be uncertainty as to the collection of the entire judgment. This latter factor
was the rationale used to require the appointment of a nonparental guardian in White v. Osborne,
251 N.C. 56, 59-60, 110 S.E.2d 449, 451-52 (1959).
122. The trial judge could use his discretionary power to supervise the creation of a private
support trust managed by a professional trustee, such as a bank. A private trust, properly adminis-
tered, vould provide the same security as a guardianship, but reduced judicial overview would result
in substantial savings in administrative costs. See Fratcher, Powers and Duties of Guardians of Prop-
erty, 45 IowA L. REv. 264, 334 (1960).
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